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even if, at some later time or in some different culture,
different typologies would need to be applied. 
“Justice in recruitment” is advanced by DuBois as an
example of a non-universal and variant type that cannot
be represented in an ontology. But this is in fact an
excellent example to illustrate the potential usefulness of
our proposed ontology. Comparing and contrasting dif-
fering views of justice in recruitment by linking cases
through an ontology whose coverage domain includes
a type labeled justice in recruitment will make for
some interesting and useful studies, and possibly help
to alleviate injustices due to local bias or prejudice. The
assumption is that there is some commonality among
multiple uses of the term “justice,” even if there are dif-
ferences among local customs, traditions, and interpre-
tations of specific cases. 
Even if DuBois is correct in his views about ethics,
therefore, we believe that the BMEO will maintain its
utility. In fact, however, we disagree with the two
assumptions that underlie these views, namely: (1) that
ethical principles are never founded in objective reality,
and (2) that legal or regulatory principles are not subject
to ongoing interpretation. Let’s start with the first.
DuBois makes the broad claim that “ethical concepts
within pluralistic societies are social constructs.” This
leads him to the conclusion that within the realm of eth-
ical “concepts,” there are no natural kinds, and thus
ontological analysis is useless. This claim is troubling. It
implies among other things that, for instance, prior to
the Nuremburg Code, the use of human subjects with-
out informed consent was not unethical or immoral.
We, in contrast, hold to the view that what is morally
wrong today was morally wrong 100 years ago.
Certainly, in building the BMEO, we must work hard to
understand the many different sorts of entities that com-
prise what we would call “social reality” in order to
determine what basic structures are salient to the
domain of biomedical ethics, and thereby to develop an
ontology that shows how these structures are reflected in
codes, laws, rules, and processes. The latter are all in a
sense “socially constructed.” This does not, however,
imply that everything about them is socially constructed
(any more than the socially constructed nature of super-
market checkout procedures implies that the rules of
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We are glad to see our paper (“Creating a Controlled
Vocabulary for the Ethics of Human Research: Towards
a Biomedical Ethics Ontology,” JERHRE, 4(1), 43–58)
has already provoked some discussion, and that Dr.
DuBois is sympathetic at least with the aims of our work
(James M. DuBois, “The Biomedical Ethics Ontology
Proposal: Excellent Aims, Questionable Methods,”
JERHRE, 4(1), 59–62). 
DuBois ultimately questions whether the Biomedical
Ethics Ontology (BMEO) will be able to solve problems
such as: Does justice require excluding vulnerable people
from a study or rather ensuring access to research that
could benefit them or their respective communities?
When does a mere inequity amount to an injustice? In
our article, we point out that the BMEO will be no
panacea. We explicitly state that, even while it will per-
mit some automation (such as drop-down menu con-
sent form and protocol authoring) and enable useful
searching of data concerning past cases, there will
always be ethical questions that require reflection by
committee members, application of ethical principles to
new cases, and the drawing of conclusions only after
much debate. However, in order to achieve many valu-
able ends through development and use of the BMEO,
we need only find some commonalities among ethical
principles across relevant jurisdictions and fields. 
Thus even if, as DuBois holds, ethical principles are
socially constructed, developing an ontology by which we
can uncover the relations of those principles to specific
instances or cases will be useful. The ontology will link
cases in which entities of certain types are instantiated and
it will serve its purposes even if those types are subject to
change over time. Ethics committee members and others
will be able to use the ontology to search for and compare
current cases with other cases involving features of the
same or similar types, and such an ability will be useful
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arithmetic used in adding up the bill are themselves
socially constructed). The authors of the BMEO
acknowledge fundamental principles of ethics—for
instance, the principle of not using human subjects sim-
ply as a means to an end—though they recognize the
role of social reality in shaping the application and
enforcement of these principles over time. 
As to the second assumption, DuBois holds that legal
and regulatory principles are not subject to ongoing
interpretation. We believe that this assumption is incor-
rect from a legal standpoint. Regulatory principles may
or may not come pre-packaged with definitions. But
even where definitions are supplied, the latter are still
always subject to reinterpretation. Take, for example, the
constitutional principle of “due process,” for which the
framers of the U.S. Constitution offered no particularly
useful definition, but which remains the law of the land
in the U.S.A. Even after 230 years of jurisprudence, the
legal interpretation of “due process” still remains subject
to debate. Yet the single principle that certain process is
necessarily due in criminal matters has remained in
force throughout this time. The approach we propose is
not meant to define such principles from scratch, but
rather to express them in useful ways that stay as close
as possible to the current, working definitions of the rel-
evant terms in regulatory contexts. So, legal ontologists
keeping track of the term “due process,” for instance,
will have a concise definition of the term that will allow
them to keep track of how the principle is being applied
in any given period.
We are thankful for this early and fervent discussion,
and encourage future dialogue and critique while we
continue to work on developing the BMEO.
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